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Over the years EU member states favored an intergovernmental approach to 
policy-making within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This approach 
emphasized the role played by national authorities, as member states' 
representatives, within a “soft governance” framework. In this framework, 
national representatives voluntarily participated in various coordinative networks 
and committees, which relied on interstate negotiations to create policies. 
However, the Euro area crisis highlighted the shortcomings of the 
intergovernmental approach to policy-making, such as divergent implementation 
of policies and regulatory arbitrage, which undermined the EMU’s stability. After 
the crisis, we are witnessing a centralization of policy creation processes and 
decision-making within the EMU, with apparently limited room for “old 
intergovernmentalism”. New actors such as the European Supervisory 
Authorities, perfectly embody this development since they require from member 
states to commonly agree “under the shadow” of non-majoritarian institutions, at 
times even against their own policy preferences. This raises important questions 
on the role of “old” conceptual frameworks in explaining current EU integration. 
Therefore, this paper explores the concept of intergovernmentalism (and also, 
“liberal intergovernmentalism”) as one the key driving forces within EMU’s 
governance, offering further insight into raised questions as well as arguing in 
favor of its political and integrationist potential in the years to come. 
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1. Introduction 
From the inception of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) its governance has 
been characterized as intergovernmental. As one of the theories of EU integration, 
intergovernmentalism underscores the role of member states’ cooperation in decision-making 
made within a multilateral environment.1 Over the years the concept of intergovernmentalism 
has been extended in order to accommodate new socio-economic realities with one of the most 
important reformulations delivered by Andrew Moravcsik in 1993, in the form of the liberal 
intergovernmentalism theory.2 Although an undisputed driving force behind the EMU project, 
(liberal) intergovernmentalism proved as an inefficient mode to govern economic turbulences, 
as dramatically demonstrated by the Euro area crisis. A rapidly exacerbating crisis demanded 
swift policy responses and regulatory measures, which was not within EMU’s capacity since 
intergovernmental governance orthodoxy centered on interstate negotiations and bargaining, 
both time consuming processes. At the same time, the crisis exposed (liberal) 
intergovernmentalism’s troublesome by-products, such as inconsistent policy implementation 
across the EU, which in practice translated to regulatory arbitrage within the internal market 
for financial services. This has impaired the level playing field for relevant stakeholders within 
the EMU and, most importantly, it has undermined long-term financial stability. In an attempt 
to stabilize the internal market and the EMU overall, European policymakers decided to opt 
for “more Europe”, therefore deciding to overhaul the EU’s framework of economic 
governance with a series of far-reaching reforms.  
One of the more interesting and crucial transformations in this respect has been the so-called 
“agencification” of the EMU.3 The establishment of three sectoral European Supervisory 
Authorities (ESAs)4 – the first set of EU agencies in this policy area – as a response to the 
crisis has noticeably narrowed the “autonomy and sovereignty of national governments within 
the realm of economic policy”.5 Namely, the ESAs made a major leap in terms of governance 
centralization since they dispose with substantive policy powers and a high degree of 
institutional independence.6 Building up on the existing framework where “soft modes” of 
governance existed within various committees and networks, the ESAs formalized intra-
agency dynamics, with a “creeping supranationalization” of policy-making. This is because 
                                                 
1 Cini, M., European Union Politics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006., at p. 100.  
2 Moravcsik, A., Preferences and Power  in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol .31, No. 4, 1993., pp. 473-524. See further in Moravcsik, A., The 
Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, 1998.  
3 The term “agencification” refers to the establishment of EU agencies as central entities in decision-making 
procedures and policy creation processes within the economic and monetary sphere. See further in Egeberg, 
M.; Trondal, J., Agencification of the European Union administration-connecting the dots, TARN Working 
Paper No. 1, 2016. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2754716 (Accessed 
on 3.6.2019.) 
4 They are: the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and 
the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). 
5 Maris, G.; Sklias, P., Intergovernmentalism and the New Framework of EMU Governance, In: Fabbrini, F.; Hirsch 
Ballin, E.; Somsen, H. (Eds.), What Form of Government for the European Union and the Eurozone?, Hart 
publishing, Oxford and Portland-Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2015., pp. 57-75., at p. 57. 
6 Busuioc, M., European Agencies-Law and Practices of Accountability, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013., 
at p. 16. 
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policies are now being created even against distinct national preferences, with member states 
obliged to comply with decisions commonly agreed among member states within ESAs’ 
executive organs (the Board of Supervisors in the first place). At the same time, decision-
making within these structures is seemingly moving away from the old form of 
intergovernmentalism, primarily because of EU’s current challenging reality of differentiated 
integration. Namely, in the EU and the EMU two subsets of countries with starkly different 
economic positions co-exist: the Central and South-Eastern European countries and those of 
Western Europe, whose economic and institutional differences are then further confronted 
within the Euro area. Furthermore the establishment of the Banking Union (BU) that coalesces 
with the Euro area exclusively, brings further fragmentation. Within EMU's complex system 
of integration, there is potential for Euro area member states to closely align in various policy 
issues and exert decisive leverage in decision-making procedures within the ESAs. In other 
words, functional inequality7 may jeopardize EMU's long-standing tradition of 
intergovernmentalism. This raises important questions on the role of member states in policy 
creation processes and on the relevance of intergovernmentalism overall.8 Against this 
background, the following sections explore intergovernmentalism, “liberal” and “new” 
intergovernmentalism, as key driving forces of EMU’s progress, arguing in favor of their 
political and integrationist relevance in the post-crisis environment. 
2. (Liberal) intergovernmentalism: revisiting the literature 
The progressive process of political and financial integration in Europe has been widely 
covered in literature, especially by political theory and political/social philosophy scholarship, 
which are interested in grasping and explaining the main conceptual motivations and 
ideological drivers behind the project. According to Moravcsik, those that figure prominently 
are: 1) federalist beliefs, which view the EU as a community of shared identity and purpose as 
envisaged by the cosmopolitan idea; 2) economic prosperity motivations, considering that 
macroeconomic and trade interdependencies between EU countries support multilateral 
economic policies; and finally, 3) the concept of peace and democracy, which assure “peaceful 
accommodation among democratic states with an historical legacy of conflict”.9 Among them, 
the concept of democracy is one of the genuine drivers of the EU integration project from the 
historic, post-World War II founding treaties to the present day. Piattoni rightly underscores 
that this is a fluid and multifaceted concept, which must take account of several normative and 
political assumptions.10 In the context of EU integration and the EMU project, member states 
                                                 
7 Functional equality relates to “the creation and maintenance of a ‘level playing field’ between different subsets 
of countries in the EU within various modes of governance in the financial market, through carefully 
designed decision-making mechanisms that provide each subset of countries with similar opportunities to 
shape policy outputs.” See further in Božina Beroš, M., Agencies in European Banking – A Critical 
Perspective, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2018., at p. 9.  
8 Maris, G.; Skilas, P., op. cit. note 5., at p. 57. 
9 Moravcsik, A., Preferences and Power  in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol .31, No. 4, 1993., pp. 473-524., at p. 484. 
10 Piattoni, S., The European Union between Intergovernmentalism and 'Shared and  Responsible Sovereignty': The 
Haptic Potential of EMU's Institutional Architecture, Government and Opposition, 
doi:10.1017/gov.2016.48, pp. 1-27., at p. 6.  
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should have an ideational convergence in respect of “what democracy is”, revolving around 
several essential elements determined by Fung: 
“First, it must offer an articulation of the values that relate collective decisions and 
actions to the interests and views of the individuals who compose a collectivity. (...) Second, 
every democratic conception must recommend institutions – for example, political liberties, 
competitive elections, (...) civic associations, referenda, (...) and peak bargaining arrangements 
– that advance its underlying values. Third, values and institutional prescriptions are typically 
connected deductively by presuming empirical facts – often quite stylized – about the political 
psychology and capabilities of individuals and about sociopolitical dynamics.”11 
The core of these elements – member states’ values and interests, bargaining 
arrangements, and institutional commitment, optimally coalesce in the intergovernmental 
theory of EU integration. As one of the “axis of integration”, intergovernmentalism suggests 
that a process of interstate negotiations and bargaining decisively shapes the EU and its various 
policy sectors (therefore, the EMU as well).12 Without interfering with member states’ 
sovereignty, the process allows national, particularistic interests and inclinations to be 
confronted, coordinated and reconciled toward commonly agreed interests and goals, 
consequently producing a “cooperative solution” that advances the project of EU integration 
in various policy areas.13 Intergovernmentalism clearly underscores the role of national states 
in integration dynamics as primary actors in this political process, which “transfer various 
competences and powers to the European supranational institutions only if they can take 
control in various policy sectors.”14 Moreover, from the perspective of intergovernmentalism 
the role of national states is invaluable since “citizens’ preferences are aggregated at the 
national level”, which through a democratic chain of representation steer “national 
governmental representatives” in interstate negotiations at the EU level.15  
As a practical confirmation of EU’s (and EMU’s) intergovernmentalist nature, over the 
years national representatives gathered under the auspices of different coordinative bodies 
such as networks or committees16 relying on soft law tools (for instance, information sharing 
                                                 
11 Fung, A., Democratic Theory and Political Science: A Pragmatic Method of Constructive Engagement, American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2007., pp. 443-458., as cited in Piattoni, S., The European Union 
between Intergovernmentalism and 'Shared and  Responsible Sovereignty': The Haptic Potential of EMU's 
Institutional Architecture, Government and Opposition, doi:10.1017/gov.2016.48, pp. 1-27, at p. 6.  
12 Hoon, L., Supranational Democracy Adrift? The 2019 Elections and the Future of Europe, Egmont Paper 
February, 2019., p. 5. Available at: http://www.egmontinstitute.be/supranational-democracy-adrift-the-
2019-elections-and-the-future-of-europe (Accessed on 7.6.2019.) 
13 Schimmelfenning, F., Liberal intergovernmentalism and the euro area crisis, Journal of European Public Policy, 
Vol. 22, No. 2, 2015., pp. 177-195., at p. 177.  
14 Jensen, C. S., “Neo-functionalism” in Cini, M. (Eds.), European Union Politics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2007., as cited by Maris, G.; Sklias, P., op.cit. note 5., at p. 62. 
15 Piattoni, S., op.cit. note 9., at p. 7.  
16 For instance, the Lamfalussy Level 3 Committees (LL3C). The three sectoral committees in the area of finance 
(the Committee of European Banking supervisors – CEBS, the Committee of European Securities 
regulators – CESR, and the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors – 
CEIOPS) were developed under the Lamfalussy framework for the regulation of financial services 
introduced by the 2001 Lamfalussy Report. The LL3Cs were consultative bodies that consisted of national 
competent authorities working together (on a voluntarily basis) to develop common recommendations and 
guidelines, which were then used by the European Commission in order to improve regulation in each of 
the three financial sectors. For more information see: European Commission, Regulatory process in 
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and peer-review) in order to foster harmonization and convergence of regulatory and 
supervisory practices in economic and monetary matters. But the goal proved far more 
challenging than anticipated, since member states were rather protective of distinct domestic 
policy concerns, which ultimately meant that intergovernmentalism advanced integration only 
if national interests were interrelated.17 What can be concluded from this is that 
intergovernmentalism – in its genuine form – cannot fully harness and explain the process of 
EU and monetary integration.18  
As mentioned earlier, thanks to a prolific scholarship in the field of EU integration, the 
framework has been reformulated and extended, with the greatest impact made by Andrew 
Moravcsik back in 1993, with his seminal contribution on integration dynamics in the form of 
the liberal intergovernmentalism theory.19 The importance of liberal intergovernmentalism as 
a conceptual framework to explain integration dynamics in the field of economic and monetary 
policy rests on the theory’s core elements: firstly, rational state behavior, secondly, liberal 
theory of national preferences’ formation, and thirdly, institutional commitments to interstate 
negotiations.20 Put simply, liberal intergovernmentalism argues that domestic economic 
interests inform national policy preferences, which are then bargained with other member 
states the EU level typically “under the shadow of hierarchy” of an EU institution21 in order 
to support credible member states’ commitments to commonly agreed objectives as well as to 
incentivize progress in specific policy fields.  
A case in point is the agencification of the EMU, where decentralized, EU agencies are 
becoming focal points of economic governance thanks to their functioning as institutional 
structures where national representatives in the financial and monetary area can confront, 
coordinate and reconcile their multiple, and at times conflicting, national preferences. As the 
backbone of EMU’s governance, agencies strive to create a level playing field among different 
stakeholders involved in policy-making and to advance a “positive sum game”. Considering 
the policy capacity and the level of institutional independence enjoyed by the agencies 
governing the EMU, the notion of (liberal) intergovernmentalism as established by relevant 
scholarship becomes challenged. Namely, the process does not rely on the “supranational axis 
of EU integration”22 but rather on a process of interstate co-operation that streamlines national 
policies toward “Europeanized” outputs – and in this it is much similar to the essence of 
(liberal) intergovernmentalism. But the added value of agencification is efficiency in policy-
making, and this undermines true intergovernmentalism, which is not quick in delivering 
policies.23 Moreover, because of important differences emerging in EMU’s integration 
structure, agencies are becoming more aware of their power to impinge on national policy 
                                                 
financial services, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-
finance/financial-reforms-and-their-progress/regulatory-process-financial-services/regulatory-process-
financial-services_en (Accessed on 27.5.2019.) 
17 Maris, G.; Sklias, P., op.cit. note 5., at p. 62. 
18 ibid., at p. 62. 
19 Moravcsik, A., op.cit. note 8. See further in Moravcsik, A., The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State 
Power from Messina to Maastricht, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998.  
20 Moravcsik, A., op.cit. note 8., at p. 480.  
21 Cram, L., In the Shadow of Hierarchy: Governance as a Tool of Government, in Dehousse, R. (Ed.), The 
“Community Method” – Obstinate or Obsolete?, Palgrave Macmillan, Basignstoke, 2011., pp. 151-165. 
22 Hoon, L., op.cit. note 11., at p. 5.  
23 ibid., p. 7 and p. 19. 
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preferences thus compelling member states to “Europeanization”, even against their genuine 
inclinations. The following section examines the transition from “liberal” to “new” 
intergovernmentalism in light of EMU’s agencification post-crisis.   
3. The agencification of the EMU: evidence of “new intergovernmentalism”? 
As noted previously, the Eurozone crisis prompted EU policymakers to reconsider the 
core paradigms and operational structures of economic governance. Among the manifold 
interventions and reforms, the establishment of decentralized EU agencies24 as new focal 
points of decision-making indisputably presents one of the more interesting and bold policy 
steps. On the one hand, this is because agencies in finance had a mission to finally disassociate 
policy-making from any kind of particularistic interests (be it member states’ or that of the 
private sector) in favor of genuinely European policies. However, on the other hand, in order 
to effectively achieve that the set of EU agencies operating within the EMU – the ESAs as 
well as the Single Resolution Board25 as the most recent addition – had to progress further 
along in terms of agencies’ powers and independence in comparison to the model of EU 
agencies that existed in other policy sectors (for instance, in education, transport, etc.). Indeed, 
before the agencification of the financial sector EU agencies were careful to tailor their 
existence, tasks and powers to predetermined legal and institutional limitations – primarily to 
the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU as well as the EU integration principle of 
institutional balance. This is not to say that the ESAs and the SRB do not respect set 
limitations, rather what we are witnessing is that these agencies started stretching them to 
accommodate new policy powers and competencies.26  Furthermore, one of the more valuable 
features of agencies is that they strive to create a “level playing field” between stakeholders 
involved in decision-making processes, and to this end they adopt an intergovernmental 
approach, meaning that they center decision-making primarily on deliberations and 
negotiations between stakeholders’ preferences but within legally set procedures. While 
interstate bargaining implied ample timing in making decisions, agencies allow decisions to 
be made swiftly, in line with financial market movement. To this end the ESAs’ and the SRB’s 
decision-making centers on distinct voting modalities, which allow a more effective 
coordination of actor-specific preferences and the delivering of consistent common policies.  
Yet, the EMU’s complex system of governance challenges the success of agencies, since 
differentiated integration allows subsets of countries (such as the Euro area member states) 
that are pushing together ahead in political and monetary integration to gain leverage in 
decision-making processes. A case in point is the 2014 study of HM Government, which 
cautions that “greater convergence of political and economic interests among euro area 
                                                 
24 The term refers to specialized, non-majoritarian EU bodies with legal personality, which are established to 
exercise public authority  however separate from (or decentralized) other EU institutions such as the 
European Commission or the Council of the EU. See further in: Busuioc, M., op.cit. note 6., at p. 21. 
25 The Single Resolution Board, or the SRB, is one of the key executive entities of the Banking union. This agency 
is the focal point of the Single Resolution Mechanism (the Banking union's second operative pillar 
alongside the Single Supervisory Mechanism) gathers national resolution authorities of Banking union-
participating countries together with the European Commission and the Council of the EU (as well as some 
other relevant stakeholders) in formalized decision-making process on resolution matters.  
26 This is the so-called “qualitative increase” in agency powers and it is comprehensively examined by Busuioc, 
M., op.cit. 6., for instance at. p. 15.  
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Member States” can marginalize non-Euro area interests in agency governance.27 Arguably, 
this questions the relevance of intergovernmentalism as one of EU integration’s core 
principles. Functional inequality and the prevalence of the compulsory mode of coordination 
(i.e. one that impinges or goes against own preferences) do not correlate with genuine 
intergovernmentalism. Scholarship has been quick to respond to intergovernmentalism's 
recalibration in this sense, by delivering the concept of “new intergovernmentalism”.28  
Arguing how new intergovernmentalism is a “distinct phase of EU integration” that we 
follow since the signing of the Maastricht treaty, Bickerton et al., brilliantly elucidate several 
building blocks of the concept, offering a new dimension into the long-standing research of 
the methods of EU integration as well as the nature of economic governance.29 Indeed, when 
considering these building blocks, the EMU as a policy sector appears to perfectly embody 
new intergovernmentalism. Firstly, following the elaboration of Bickerton et al., we can 
observe that in the post-crisis socio-economic dynamics of the EMU, the tenants of “old 
intergovernmentalism” – deliberation and consensus are “at the heart of EU policy-making in 
general, and especially in settings that are explicitly intergovernmental in their institutional 
determinations.”30 The ESAs and the SRB clearly support this hypothesis, which moreover fits 
well with a second elaboration by the same group of authors – namely, new 
intergovernmentalism implies that new entities are established as focal points for collective 
action in policy sectors that demand carefully tailored, yet swift, responses such as economic 
and monetary matters. This is indeed true for the EMU, where Hoon notes the process of: 
“(…) delegation of tasks that could (in a truly supranational scenario) be fulfilled by the 
Commission to so-called de novo  bodies. These are largely bureaucratic institutions with 
considerable political power, founded and legitimized by the member states.”31 
Thirdly, and finally, new intergovernmentalism appears as a neat conceptual framework 
for EMU’s post-crisis governance, since – according to Bickerton et al., it acknowledges that 
the EU is indeed “in a state of disequilibrium”32, which is plainly illustrated by the 
fragmentation of the EMU along the lines of Euro area membership and Banking union 
participation.  
4. Conclusions  
In a few years we will mark a decade since the offset of the Euro area crisis, and in this 
sense it is already possible to draw lessons on the its policy and institutional implications. One 
of the more important lessons regards the appropriateness of the EMU’s ideational framework 
and its governance. Namely, from their very beginning economic and monetary integration 
have been strongholds of intergovernmentalism, as opposed to any supranational aspirations 
                                                 
27 HM Government, Review of the Balance of Competences Between the United Kingdom and the European Union. 
The Single Market: Financial Services and the Movement of Capital. Summer 2014, at p. 106. 
28 See for instance in: Bickerton, C. J., et al., The New Intergovernmentalism: European Integration in the Post-
Maastricht Era, Journal of Common Market Studies, https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12212., pp. 1-20.; 
Piattoni, S., op. cit. note 9., at p. 8., and Hoon, L., op.cit. note 11., at p. 7. 
29 Bickerton, et al., op. cit. note 27., at p. 15. 
30 Bickerton, et al., op. cit. note 27., at p. 9. 
31 Hoon, L., op.cit. note 11., at p. 7. 
32 Bickerton, et al., op. cit. note 27., at p. 14. 
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of the EU. This meant that member states retained a central role in policy creation processes 
within policies covered by the EMU (e.g. banking regulation, financial stability) because 
national policy preferences were confronted and then coordinated on a voluntarily basis, in a 
“soft governance” setting. Intergovernmentalism was the norm for many years, until the crisis 
exposed many undesirable byproducts of such mode of economic governance, such as the 
reality of an un-level playing field in the internal market for financial services.  
Led by a rationalist logic of “not letting a good crisis to waste”, EU policymakers have 
shifted gears in economic governance, by establishing new legal and institutional framework 
of member states’ dynamics. Some of these developments – most notably the establishment of 
EU agencies within the financial and monetary sector – challenge “old intergovernmentalism”. 
This is because the EU agencies that now form the governance backbone of the EMU dispose 
with noticeable power to impinge and shape national policy preferences, as well as to oblige 
member states comply with commonly agreed goals. Considering that EU agencies are widely 
praised for their ability to insulate European policymaking from particularistic biases because 
of their constituency (i.e. experts from various policy fields), the departure from “old 
intergovernmentalism” ushered by agencification should be welcomed one. As policy-making 
in the EMU becomes even more “output driven” and “as true intergovernmentalism (…) 
hinders quick and efficient decision-making“33 it signals that the EMU has to search for new 
concepts and ideas that can appropriately frame member states’ relations.  
Indeed, “the use of de novo bodies signals a shift in the pattern of EU integration”34, 
however not toward supranationalism as feared by some, but “new intergovernmentalism”. 
This is a versatile concept that can adequately frame economic and political realities the EMU 
faces post-crisis, in which deliberation and consensus among member states are steered by 
new entities (i.e., the ESAs) whose founding legislation precisely defines stakeholders’ 
capacities, tasks, and delineates decision-making process, voting modalities and timing. 
Although agencification resembles “creeping supranationalization”, scholarship has rather 
defined it as a re-calibration of genuine intergovernmentalism, as the concept’s new and 
improved form. What results from this is that intergovernmentalism is still a relevant analytical 
lens through which relationship dynamic between stakeholders’ in the economic and monetary 
policy sector can be explained. At the same time, however, we must be aware that the work of 
agencies is susceptible to particularistic influences and leverage, which reignites “old 
questions about European integration concerning the centrality of the state, and transnational 
interactions.”35 Far from being decided, the discussion regarding the EMU’s conceptual 
framework is bound to intensify in the years to come, searching for a variety of 
intergovernmentalism that will be able to frame institutional and political developments.  
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